Humans have the tendency to commit to a single interpretation of what has caused some observed 1 evidence rather than considering all possible alternatives. This tendency can explain various forms 2 of confirmation and reference biases. However, committing to a single high-level interpretation 3 seems short-sighted and irrational, and thus it is unclear why humans seem motivated to pursue 4 such strategy. 5 In a first step toward answering this question, we systematically quantified how this strategy affects 6 estimation accuracy at the feature level in the context of two universal hierarchical inference tasks, 7 categorical perception and causal cue combination. Using model simulations, we demonstrate 8 that although estimation is generally impaired when conditioned on only a single high-level inter-9 pretation, the impairment is not uniform across the entire feature range. On the contrary, compared 10 to a full inference strategy that considers all high-level interpretations, accuracy is actually better 11 for feature values for which the probability of an incorrect categorical/structural commitment is rel-12 atively low. That is to say, if an observer is reasonably certain about the high-level interpretation 13 of the feature, it is advantageous to condition subsequent feature inference only on that particular 14 interpretation. We also show that this benefit of commitment is substantially amplified if late noise 15 corrupts information processing (e.g., during retention in working memory). Our results suggest 16 that top-down inference strategies that solely rely on the most likely high-level interpretation can 17 be favorable and at least locally outperform a full inference strategy. 18 performance 20 25 rate description of human behavior in a broad range of tasks associated with perception (Knill and 26 Richards, 1996), cognitive reasoning (Griffiths et al., 2010), economic decision-making (Summer-27 field and Tsetsos, 2012) and motor control (Wolpert, 2007). Furthermore, mental disorders such 28 as autism and schizophrenia have been directly linked to specific computational deficiencies of this 29 inference process (Lieder et al., 2019; Jardri and Deneve, 2013). Except for simple estimation and 30 decision-making tasks (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Stocker and Simon-31 celli, 2006), the generative models of these tasks are hierarchical. Object recognition is a simple 32 example of a hierarchical inference task where, at the top of the hierarchy, object categories are 33 defined as specific distributions over some lower-level feature representation potentially across 34 multiple levels of feature integration. Noisy observations at the lowest feature level then allow 35 to infer the corresponding object category by inverting the hierarchical generative model (Ker-36 sten et al., 2004). Various studies have shown that human behavior in such tasks is accurately 37 described by Bayesian statistics that fully integrate all information in the hierarchical generative 38 model (i.e., fully marginalizes) from bottom to top. These studies include models of human judg-39 ments of sameness (Van den Berg et al., 2012), of stimulus transparency (Hedges et al., 2011), 40
Introduction 21
Cognitive tasks typically require some form of statistical inference where the brain has to infer an 22 unknown quantity based on given yet uncertain evidence and a learned statistical (generative) 23 model of the task (Helmholtz, 1867; Jaynes, 2003; Lee and Mumford, 2003) . Previous work has 24 shown that this notion in combination with the formalism of Bayesian statistics provides an accumodel evaluation (Draper, 1995) , or Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting et al., 1999) , and has 48 been previously suggested to account for human behavior in various perceptual and cognitive 49 reasoning tasks (Duffy et al., 2006; Körding et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2010; Knill, 2003 Knill, , 2007 . 50 However, recent studies have reported conditions in which human subjects seem to abandon the 51 averaging strategy and rather commit to a specific interpretation of what caused the evidence 52 (model selection). For example, by making an category assignment a subject's subsequent per-53 ceptual estimate of a low-level stimulus feature (e.g., motion direction (Jazayeri and Movshon, 54 2007; Zamboni et al., 2016) or visual orientation (Luu and Stocker, 2018; Fritsche and de Lange, 55 2019)) is biased towards the assigned category on a per trial basis. These biases can be thought 56 of as a form of consistency (Brehm, 1956) or confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) where the per-57 ceptual estimate aligns with and confirms the chosen category (Bronfman et al., 2015; Talluri et al., 58 that can be expressed with a directed graph as shown in Fig. 1a . The hierarchical component of 84 the model "above θ" represents a high-level generative hypothesis H about the potential values 85 of θ. A simple example for such a hypothesis is the association of θ with a particular category. 86 More elaborate high-level hypotheses may include different structural assumptions (i.e., different 87 graphs) that capture different contextual or causal dependencies (Körding et al., 2007; Kemp and 88 Tenenbaum, 2008; Battaglia et al., 2013) . However, our analysis is agnostic to the specific form 89 of H as it only assumes that the feature θ is at the "bottom" of the hierarchy, and that sensory 90 evidence m only directly depends on θ and not the rest of the hierarchy. 91 We consider two different inference strategies. The first strategy is to make use of the full posterior 92 probability over hypotheses when inferring the feature (here referred to as "full inference"), that is, 93 to marginalize over all possible high-level hypotheses (Fig. 1b ). Thus, we can express the posterior 94 over θ as a weighted sum 95 p(θ|m) ∝ i p(θ|m, H i )p(H i |m) (full inference) ,
with weights given by the posterior probability of each hypothesis given the evidence, p(H i |m). 96 The second, alternative strategy represents a sequential inference process (Stocker and Simon-97 celli, 2007; Luu and Stocker, 2018) : First, a hypothesisĤ is selected according to the posterior 98 probability p(H|m) (here, the hypothesis with maximal posterior probability), and then the posterior 99 over θ is computed conditioned on the observed evidence m and the chosen hypothesisĤ ( Fig.   100 1c). The chosen hypothesis imposes a conditioned prior p(θ|Ĥ) that, unlike in the full inference 101 strategy, depends on the sensory evidence and thus is potentially different for each m (i.e., on 102 each trial). Accordingly, the posterior probability for this second strategy can be written as 103 p(θ|m,Ĥ) ∝ p(m|θ)p(θ|Ĥ) (conditioned inference) .
In the following we compare the performance of these two strategies in estimating θ. With pos-104 terior probabilities Eqs. (1) and (2) a single node C reflecting the categorical assignment of feature θ (Fig. 2a ). The generative pro-117 cess first involves the selection of a category C based on a categorical prior p(C); for simplicity, 118 we consider here only two possible categories C ∈ {C 1 , C 2 }. A feature value θ is then sampled 119 from the categorical feature prior p(θ|C). Finally, sensory evidence m is sampled from the con-120 ditional probability p(m|θ). Also, we explicitly allow the possibility that late noise may deteriorate 121 sensory evidence m due to e.g. retention in working memory. We refer to the deteriorated sen-122 sory evidence as m * distributed according to p(m * |m). The specific description of the priors and 123 conditional probabilities is provided in Fig. 2 and its caption.
124

Estimate distributions
125 Given the generative model, we can now express an optimal estimateθ(m) of the feature value 126 for both inference strategies. The full inference strategy ( 
Minimizing mean squared-error (i.e., minimizing L 2 loss) we find the optimal estimator according 129 to the full inference strategy as
In contrast, the conditioned inference strategy consists of two inference steps ( Fig. 1c) . First, the 131 most probable category is chosen based on the sensory evidence m according to
where the posterior is defined as p(C|m) ∝ p(C) θ p(m|θ)p(θ|C). Second, the posterior over θ is 133 computed conditioned on the chosen categoryĈ(m), thus 134 p(θ|m,Ĉ(m)) ∝ p(m|θ)p(θ|Ĉ(m)) . Finally, the optimal estimator is given as 135θ c (m,Ĉ(m)) = θ θ p(θ|m,Ĉ(m)) .
Note, that for both strategies the optimal estimator represents a monotonic mapping between the 136 evidence and the estimate. Thus, we can obtain the estimate distributions p(θ f |θ) and p(θ c |θ) with 137 a change of variable for the measurement distribution p(m|θ), replacing m with the estimateθ f (m) 138 andθ c (m) according to Eqs. (4) and (7), respectively. Figure 2b shows the resulting distributions 139 for both strategies given the specific parameter settings of our generative model. Note that the 140 estimate distributions fundamentally differ; the conditioned inference strategy exhibits a character-141 istic bimodal distribution for θ values close to the category boundary, which matches a range of 142 experimental results (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zamboni et al., 2016; Luu and Stocker, 2018) . 143 Consider the possibility that late noise may further deteriorate sensory evidence m (e.g. due to 144 retention in working memory (Schneegans and Bays, 2018)) we update the formulations of the 145 optimal estimators accordingly. Assuming that late noise is additive Gaussian (with σ m ), we com-146 pute the optimal estimate and the estimate distribution for the full inference strategy as discussed 
where p(θ|m * ,Ĉ) ∝ p(m * |θ)p(θ|Ĉ). By a change of variable in p(m * |θ,Ĉ) substituting m * with the 152 estimateθ(m * ,Ĉ), we find p(θ|θ,Ĉ). Then the estimate distributions are obtained as
where p(Ĉ|θ) = m p(Ĉ|m)p(m|θ). Figure 2b shows the estimate distributions given the feature 154 value for full and conditioned inference for moderate level of late noise.
155
Relative accuracy of full vs. conditioned inference strategy 156 Having defined the optimal estimate distributions for both the full and the conditioned inference 157 strategy, we next perform a systematic quantitative comparison between the estimation accu-158 racy for various model parameters and categorical priors. We defined relative accuracy as the 159 ratio between the expected estimation errors for both inference strategies. Because the optimal estimators were derived with regard to a quadratic loss function (L 2 -norm), we accordingly 161 defined the expected estimation error as the mean squared-error (MSE). We computed relative 162 accuracy both locally, i.e., for both strategies we computed the MSE for each θ separately as 163 MSE(θ) = θ p(θ|θ)(θ − θ) 2 and then took the ratio, as well as globally, i.e., we marginalized the 164 local error over the total distribution of feature values MSE = θ MSE(θ)p(θ) and then took the 165 ratio. 166 We considered two general conditions of categorical feature priors. First, we assumed the priors 167 p(θ|C 1,2 ) to be overlapping Gaussian distributions (Fig. 3a) . Local relative accuracy with and 168 without late noise is shown in Fig. 3b . Both curves show a similar, characteristic shape. For 169 θ values close to the category boundary, the full inference strategy provides better estimates. 170 However, for θ values that are farther away than a certain distance from the category boundary, the 171 conditioned inference strategy consistently outperforms the full inference strategy. This came as 172 a surprise. The advantage of the conditioned inference strategy is amplified if we further assume 173 that late noise (σ m ) corrupts the inference process. The distance from the category boundary 174 at which the conditioned inference strategy starts to provide superior estimates corresponds to a 175 certain probability level of making the correct categorical assignmentĈ, i.e., a certain level of the 176 psychometric function shown in Fig. 3c . It demonstrates that for conditions where the observer 177 is reasonably certain of the correct feature category (e.g., a probability correct of p = 0.92 if 178 there is no late noise) the conditioned inference strategy outperforms the full inference strategy. 179 As expected, global relative accuracy for the conditioned inference strategy is always inferior to 180 the full inference strategy if there is no late noise ( Fig. 3d ). This is because the benefits of the 181 full inference strategy for θ values around the category boundary make up for the deficits for θ 182 values outside of that range. The situation changes, however, if substantial late noise impacts 183 the inference process. In this case the conditioned strategy can also globally outperform the full 184 inference strategy ( Fig. 3d ). 185 We obtain similar results for non-overlapping categorical feature priors (Fig. 3e ). This corresponds 186 to many of the estimation tasks reported in previous studies (Jazayeri and Movshon, 2007; Zam-187 boni et al., 2016; Luu and Stocker, 2018) . Local relative accuracy shows very similar curves 188 ( Fig. 3f ), indicating the supremacy of the conditioned inference strategy for θ values that corre-189 spond to similar certainty levels in the categorical assignment ( Fig. 3g ). Also the global accuracy 190 comparison shows similar behavior (Fig. 3h ). While we limited our accuracy analysis in the main 191 paper for the case of minimizing squared-error (i.e., the L 2 norm), we explored other commonly This integration versus segregation distinction can be modeled within the generative hierarchical 203 framework we discuss here ( Fig. 1a ). However, different to the categorical perception example, the conditioned only on the chosen structure, thus p(θ 1 , θ 2 |m 1 , m 2 ,Ŝ).
213
Feature estimation 214 According to the hierarchical generative model shown in Fig. 4a we can define the optimal esti-215 mator under each inference strategy. For S = S 1 (common cause), the corresponding posterior 216 distribution at the feature level is 217 p(θ 1,2 = θ|m 1 , m 2 , S 1 ) ∝ p(m 1 , m 2 |θ)p(θ|S 1 ) .
For S = S 2 (independent causes), the posterior distribution changes to 218 p(θ 1 , θ 2 |m 1 , m 2 , S 2 ) ∝ p(m 1 |θ 1 )p(m 2 |θ 2 )p(θ 1 , θ 2 |S 2 ) . for S 2 . Furthermore, we also assume the observed sensory measurements to be independent samples drawn from Gaussian distributions N (θ 1,2 , σ s ). With a full inference strategy, we compute the total posterior as the average posterior under both 219 hypotheses (Eqs. (10) and (11)) weighted by the posterior probability of each hypothesis, thus 220 p(θ 1 , θ 2 |m 1 , m 2 ) = i p(θ 1 , θ 2 |m 1 , m 2 , S i )p(S i |m 1 , m 2 ) .
The posterior p(S|m 1 , m 2 ) is different for the two hypothesis, namely
and 222
As in our first example, we define the optimal estimate of the feature vector [θ 1 , θ 2 ] with regard 223 to the L 2 -norm which corresponds to the expectation over the total posterior Eq. (12) (mean of 224 posterior), thus
With the conditioned inference strategy we first infer the most probable causal structure,
with p(S|m 1 , m 2 ) as defined above (Eqs. (13) and (14)). The optimal estimate of the feature vector 227 is again the expectation over the posterior distributions; however, now conditioned onŜ as well,
where the posterior is given as in Eqs. (10) and (11), according toŜ. 230 For both strategies, the estimate distributions, p(θ 1 ,θ 2 |θ 1 , θ 2 ), are obtained by marginalizing over 231 the measurement distributions p(m 1 , m 2 |θ 1 , θ 2 ) (change of variable). Figure 4b shows the estimate 232 distributions forθ 1 for both strategies with setting θ 2 = 0, equal structural priors p(S = S 1,2 ) = 0.5, 233 and Gaussian distributed feature values θ 1,2 and measurement distributions (see figure/caption for 234 details). Distributions with and without late noise are shown where late noise was again assumed 235 to be additive, independent Gaussian noise. 236 Unlike in the categorical perception example, the resulting estimate distributions for both inference 237 strategies are very similar given the chosen model parameters. Plotting the difference in distribu-238 tion density (Fig. 4c) , however, shows that the estimates are more veridical for the full inference 239 strategy for values of θ 1 close to θ 2 , whereas the conditioned strategy leads to more veridical 240 estimates for conditions where there is a substantial cue conflict, i.e., θ 1 = θ 2 .
241
Comparing estimation accuracy of full vs. conditioned inference strategy 242 Similar to the previous example, we analyzed the relative estimation accuracy of the two inference 243 strategies by computing both the local MSE(θ 1 , θ 2 ) as well as the global MSE (integral over all 244 θ 1,2 ). Results are shown in Fig. 5 . For feature value pairs (θ 1 , θ 2 ) that support both the common 245 and the independent source hypothesis, full inference outperforms conditioned inference (Fig. 5c ). 246 For feature values, however, that clearly favor one structural interpretation over the other, the 247 conditioned inference strategy is beneficial. The relative accuracy comparison is similar to the 248 categorical perception example as shown in Fig. 5d . Again, in situations where observers are 249 reasonably certain about the high-level interpretation, conditioned inference proves to be the better 250 strategy. This advantage is further amplified if late noise affects feature inference (Fig. 5e ). . This suggest that these benefits of commitment may 268 generally apply to the type of hierarchical problems in perception and cognition we consider here 269 (Fig. 1a) . 270 We also demonstrated that a conditioned inference strategy becomes increasingly favorable when late noise is affecting the inference process, to a point where it can globally outperform a full 272 inference strategy. This has implications for models and theories of working memory formation 273 and recall, and in general, for inference tasks that evolve over time (Gold and Stocker, 2017) . 274 Specifically, it suggests that the commitment to a high-level interpretation can be seen as creating 275 a robust summary representation of sensory evidence, which then, at the time of recall, is used 276 in order to improve inference accuracy. In fact, conditioned inference can predict some of the Our results also have theoretical implications. While a full inference strategy provides globally bet-282 ter estimation accuracy, a conditioned inference strategy is more accurate in situations where the 283 observer can be reasonably certain that the high-level interpretation is correct. While this certainty 284 level does not correspond to a fixed probability value and depends on the specifics of the gener-285 ative model, we found that it lies within a relative limited range for a given generative model (see 286 dashed lines in Fig. 3 ). This suggests that a mixed inference strategy that uses either conditioned 287 or full inference depending on the certainty in the high-level interpretation could globally outper-288 form full inference under any condition. It would require a meta-cognitive mechanism that monitors 289 and evaluates the observer's certainty in all possible high-level hypotheses. We are not aware of 290 any previous proposal of such a "supra-optimal" mixed inference strategy. However, it would pro-291 vide a quantitative argument for why meta-cognitive processes that monitor decision confidence 292 may be useful. Future work will show if human inference behavior shows any evidence for such a 293 mixed strategy. Our results also provide as a useful quantitative analysis for the ongoing general 294 debate about optimality/suboptimality in human perceptual and cognitive behavior (Rahnev and 295 Denison, 2018; Stocker, 2019) . 296 An obvious but willful limitation of our study is that we only analyzed accuracy at the feature level 297 (i.e., a loss function only including θ). However, cognition involves simultaneous and co-joint in-298 ference processes at all hierarchical levels that together form a holistic representation. Thus, it is 299 likely that human inference strategies have evolved with regard to error metrics that are defined at 300 the level of such holistic representations. For example, in the case of categorical perception (see 301 Fig. 2a ), the error metric would not only include errors at the feature but simultaneously also at 302 the category level. Furthermore, one can easily make the case that such metric includes certain 303 measures of consistency across the hierarchy; errors at the feature level would be irrelevant if at 304 the same time the category assignment of the feature is already wrong ("why bother about error at the low level if inference is wrong at the top level?"). It is easy to show that conditioned inference 306 globally outperforms full inference if the analysis is limited to those trials where the observer is 307 correct at the category level: As both strategies have equal performance in getting the category 308 right, conditioned inference is always beneficial because it uses the more specific feature prior 309 p(θ|Ĉ) whereĈ is correct. Also, we have recently shown how conditioned inference avoids in-310 consistencies of the representations across the hierarchy under conditions of late noise (Luu and   311 Stocker, 2018), which may be a mechanism to avoid states of cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956; 312 Festinger, 1957) . 313 Our comparison of the inference strategies did not consider potential differences in computational 314 and resource costs. There is growing evidence that cognitive and perceptual inference processes 315 are optimized also with regard to such costs, leading to inference strategies that are commonly 316 referred to as bounded rationality (Simon, 1984; Gershman et al., 2015) . Intuitively, conditioned 317 inference is a simpler and computationally less costly strategy because it performs feature infer-318 ence only for one high-level hypothesis. Future work will be needed to investigate in more detail 319 the benefits (or drawbacks) of a conditioned inference strategy with regard to hierarchical error 320 metrics and other costs such as computational complexity. 321 Finally, given that many inference problems are of the general hierarchical type considered here, 322 conditioned inference strategies may be more ubiquitous than we recognize at the moment. The 323 problem is that conditioned inference not always leads to clearly identifiable behavioral signatures 324 such as the bimodal estimate distributions in categorical perception (Fig. 2b) . In some cases be-325 havioral effects may be small and difficult to extract from experimental data (Fig. 4b,c ). Potential Kersten, 1991), or the perceived brightness of a gray patch depending on its spatial context (Adel-332 son, 1993). A detailed quantitative modeling approach will allow us to determine the extent to 333 which conditioned inference is a ubiquitous and general inference mechanism of the human brain. Using the same generative model and model parameters as in the main text ( Fig. 2a ) we formu-478 lated optimal estimators for each inference strategy as the median of the posterior distributions 479 Eqs. (3) and (6), respectively, and performed the same accuracy comparison as in the main text 480 with regard to absolute error. As shown in Fig. A.1 , the results are qualitatively very similar to the 481 L 2 -norm case (Fig. 3) . 483 We also explored the scenario that one category was more likely than the other, i.e., the case 484 p(C 1,2 ) = [0.2, 0.8]. Figure A. 2 shows the results for both overlapping and non-overlapping cate-485 gories (panels are similarly organized as in Fig. 3 ). With unequal category priors, the psychometric 486 curves p(C|θ) are shifted away from the categorical boundary (e.g., p(C 1 |θ) is shifted away from 487 the more prevalent category C 2 ). Compared to the equal prior case, the pattern of local relative 488 accuracy maintains, although it is also shifted (Fig. A.2b,f) . The asymmetric categorical priors ex-489 aggerate the differences between posteriors p(C 1 |m) and p(C 2 |m) making full inference act more 490 like conditioned inference. The differences in terms of the performance between the two strate-491 gies are consequently reduced. In the extreme case where p(C 1,2 ) = [0, 1] (only one category is 492 possible), the two strategies are functionally identical.
A.1.2 Asymmetric category priors
493
A.2 Causal cue combination: different feature prior 494 We analyzed the causal cue combination example for the case of an approximately uniform cate-495 gorical feature prior (σ p = 100). The relative performance pattern is qualitatively similar compared 496 to the example in the main text. 
